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Synopsis:	  
Development	  in	  river	  basins	  is	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  a	  range	  of	  non-­‐random	  factors,	  called	  global	  
drivers.	  These	  can	  present	  a	  bewildering	  array	  of	  effects	  that	  confound	  concerted	  action.	  This	  report	  
summarizes	  these	  effects	  with	  the	  CPWF’s	  six	  basins	  and	  presents	  a	  method	  of	  visualizing	  them	  
together	  within	  a	  process	  of	  scenario	  visualization.	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1.	  Introduction:	  Why	  examine	  “global	  drivers”?1	  
African	  rising:	  Identifying	  drivers	  from	  the	  narrative	  
A	  recent	  article	  in	  the	  Economist	  journal	  describes	  the	  rise	  of	  Africa	  from	  the	  ‘global	  problem‘of	  a	  
decade	  ago	  to	  the	  ‘hopeful	  continent’	  today.	  The	  narrative	  is	  loaded	  with	  facts	  that	  reflect	  the	  
influence	  of	  global	  drivers	  on	  African	  economies.	  	  
The	  main	  type	  of	  driver	  observed,	  naturally	  enough	  for	  this	  journal,	  are	  economic.	  It	  notes,	  that	  over	  
a	  dozen	  countries	  experience	  annual	  growth	  rates	  of	  over	  6.5%,	  that	  the	  middle	  class	  –	  defined	  as	  
people	  earning	  over	  $3,000	  a	  year	  -­‐	  is	  set	  to	  grow	  to	  over	  100m	  by	  2015.	  That	  external	  trade	  has	  
increased	  by	  200%	  in10	  years,	  that	  productivity	  is	  increasing	  by	  2.7%	  a	  year	  and	  that	  trade	  within	  the	  
continent	  has	  increased	  from	  6%	  to	  13%.	  Furthermore,	  it	  notes	  that,	  unlike	  previous	  ’false	  dawns’,	  
this	  growth	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  resources,	  which	  account	  for	  only	  about	  one	  third	  of	  the	  growth.	  
Economic	  drivers	  are	  not	  the	  only	  changes	  reported.	  Dramatic	  changes	  are	  reported	  in	  demographic	  
indicators,	  which	  have	  seen	  a	  major	  decline	  in	  infant	  mortality,	  resulting	  in	  a	  median	  population	  age	  
of	  20	  years.	  Population	  is	  expected	  to	  double	  to	  2	  billion	  and	  while	  some	  hope	  is	  expressed	  about	  
the	  possibility	  of	  reaping	  the	  ‘demographic	  dividend’,	  fears	  are	  also	  expressed	  about	  potential	  for	  
catastrophe	  if	  jobs	  are	  not	  created	  to	  absorb	  the	  young	  people	  the	  dividend	  implies.	  	  
Political	  change	  is	  seen	  as	  essential	  to	  success.	  The	  continent	  has	  seen	  major	  changes	  since	  
independence,	  not	  all	  successful.	  Recent	  improvements	  in	  politics	  have	  seen	  democratization,	  a	  
move	  away	  from	  Marxist	  politics	  (in	  Ethiopia	  and	  Mozambique)	  and	  a	  general,	  if	  somewhat	  patchy,	  
progress	  towards	  transparent	  and	  representative	  politics.	  	  
It	  is	  interesting	  that	  in	  a	  journal	  that	  focusses	  on	  economic	  	  aspects,	  global	  climate	  change	  is	  
mentioned	  explicitly,	  though	  not	  in	  detail.	  Climate	  change	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  major	  factor	  determining	  
the	  sustainability	  of	  agriculture	  within	  the	  region	  as	  economies	  move	  towards	  industrialization.	  
Finally,	  technology	  is	  also	  mentioned	  as	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  development,	  particularly	  the	  huge	  
penetration	  of	  mobile	  phones	  (with	  600m	  subscribers)	  and	  the	  possibilities	  this	  opens	  for	  micro-­‐
finance,	  novel	  health	  care	  and	  agro-­‐enterprise	  development.	  	  
The	  value	  in	  describing	  the	  drivers	  is	  as	  follows:	  Clear	  explanation	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  deliver	  a	  society	  
to	  its	  current	  condition	  helps	  understand	  how	  societies	  within	  river	  basins	  find	  themselves	  in	  a	  given	  
condition,	  and	  help	  predict	  what	  is	  likely	  to	  happen	  in	  the	  future.	  Decisions	  of	  investment	  and	  
politics	  refer	  to	  such	  insight.	  	  
Within	  the	  CWPF	  we	  are	  concerned	  specifically	  with	  the	  conditions	  of	  global	  food	  and	  water	  
systems,	  and	  the	  interaction	  of	  these	  with	  development.	  Analysis	  concludes	  that	  while	  it	  is	  
reasonable	  to	  express	  concerns	  concerning	  the	  availability	  of	  natural	  resources,	  sufficient	  resources	  
exist	  to	  support	  development	  	  through	  to	  2050,	  if	  (and	  only	  if)	  they	  are	  managed	  differently.	  
Specifically,	  the	  changes	  needed	  are	  through	  greater	  long-­‐term	  investment	  to	  improve	  productivity,	  
greater	  sharing	  of	  benefits	  and	  risks,	  all	  based	  on	  an	  underlying	  collective	  political	  discourse.	  Such	  
changes	  are	  profoundly	  influenced	  by	  drivers	  such	  as	  those	  described	  above.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  An	  introduction	  can	  be	  found	  at:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/introduction-­‐to-­‐global-­‐drivers-­‐cpwf-­‐
gdtwg-­‐workshop-­‐september-­‐2011	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framework	  is	  to	  assemble	  information	  regarding	  the	  condition	  and	  influence	  of	  these	  drivers	  in	  
basins,	  	  and	  to	  remove	  some	  of	  the	  uncertainties	  facing	  the	  Basin	  Development	  Challenges.	  
We	  organize	  this	  in	  the	  following	  sequence:	  
In	  section	  2,	  we	  describe	  some	  of	  the	  drives,	  as	  proposed	  by	  participants	  at	  three	  meetings.	  In	  
section	  3,	  we	  assemble	  this	  information	  about	  multiple	  drivers	  within	  scenarios	  for	  each	  basin.	  
Section	  4	  describes	  the	  process	  of	  response,	  indicating	  the	  key	  uncertainties	  that	  prevent	  optimal	  
change	  patterns.	  Section	  5	  summarises	  these	  findings.	  	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	   Page	  4	   	  	   	  
2.	  A	  short	  list	  of	  drivers	  
We	  briefly	  outline	  each	  of	  five	  drivers	  and	  provide	  links	  to	  presentations	  that	  explain	  the	  main	  
concepts.	  
Economic	  
Economic	  activity	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  changes	  in	  demand	  and	  supply	  that	  connect	  what	  people	  do	  
within	  basins	  with	  global	  or	  regional	  activities	  beyond	  the	  basin.	  Activity	  within	  basins	  generate	  
demand	  that	  may	  be	  met	  by	  supply	  from	  outside.	  Conversely,	  activities	  outside	  the	  basin	  may	  
stimulate	  supply	  from	  within.	  
The	  level	  of	  a	  nation’s	  (or	  basin’s)	  income	  is	  its	  GDP,	  which	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  productive	  activities,	  or	  
the	  total	  income,	  or	  the	  total	  of	  all	  consumptive	  activities.	  For	  comparison,	  it	  may	  be	  expressed	  as	  
GDP	  per	  capita.	  An	  important	  characteristic	  of	  GDP	  is	  its	  growth	  rate.	  Many	  developing	  countries	  are	  
maintaining	  growth	  rates	  of	  GDP	  in	  excess	  of	  5%,	  while	  most	  developed	  countries	  have	  growth	  rates	  
2-­‐3%.	  	  
The	  level	  of	  prices	  and	  their	  volatility	  of	  the	  commodities	  a	  nation	  imports	  or	  export	  controls	  the	  
terms	  of	  trade.	  A	  nation’s	  economic	  structure	  is	  determined	  by	  whether	  it	  depends	  on	  primary	  
industry	  such	  as	  agriculture	  and	  mining,	  on	  secondary	  industry,	  or	  on	  services.	  Investment	  may	  
comprise	  capital	  inflows	  and	  outflows	  as	  well	  as	  domestic	  investment.	  There	  is	  invariably	  
heterogeneity,	  between	  regions,	  between	  rural	  and	  urban	  communities	  and	  between	  groups	  within	  
a	  community.	  
Economic	  activity	  of	  a	  nation	  (or	  a	  basin)	  is	  affected	  by:	  
• Globalization	  (global	  liberalization	  of	  trade)	  and	  bilateral	  free-­‐trade	  agreements	  ;	  
• Protectionist	  policies;	  
• Hidden	  subsidies;	  
• Currency	  parity	  (the	  Economist’s	  big	  Mac	  index);	  
• Financial	  crises;	  and	  
• Corruption,	  which	  is	  a	  hidden	  cost	  that	  affects	  many	  developing	  countries.	  
Population	  and	  demography	  
The	  main	  controls	  on	  national	  populations	  are	  the	  birth	  and	  death	  rates.	  It	  is	  commonly	  accepted	  
that	  the	  driver	  of	  high	  birth	  rates	  is	  the	  rate	  of	  child	  mortality,	  so	  that	  when	  it	  falls,	  there	  is	  an	  
immediate,	  voluntary	  decrease	  in	  fertility	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  mean	  number	  of	  children	  per	  woman.	  
The	  time	  lag	  between	  decline	  of	  mortality	  and	  fertility	  describes	  the	  period	  of	  maximum	  population	  
growth.	  In	  China,	  some	  parts	  of	  S.E.	  Asia	  	  and	  Latin	  America,	  fertility	  rates	  are	  at	  or	  close	  to	  
replacement.	  In	  India	  increase	  is	  still	  strong,	  and	  expected	  to	  remain	  so	  for	  the	  next	  twenty	  or	  thrity	  
years.	  In	  Africa,	  fertility	  rates	  remain	  very	  high.	  UNEP	  predicts	  strong	  population	  growth	  for	  the	  
coming	  decades.	  	  
Migration	  occurs	  both	  internationally	  and	  within	  a	  country.	  It	  has	  two	  components,	  out	  migration	  
and	  in	  migration.	  Within	  countries	  it	  is	  exemplified	  by	  an	  almost	  universal	  migration	  from	  rural	  areas	  
to	  cities.	  It	  may	  be	  spontaneous	  as	  in	  many	  countries,	  or	  caused	  directly	  by	  civil	  unrest	  in	  rural	  areas,	  
as	  in	  Colombia	  and	  Peru.	  The	  major	  question	  is	  who	  migrates	  and	  why?	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Population	  structure	  is	  related	  to	  demography.	  As	  fertility	  declines,	  often	  within	  one	  generation,	  
countries	  experience	  a	  demographic	  transition	  in	  which	  there	  are	  fewer	  dependent	  on	  the	  working	  
population.	  The	  result	  is	  known	  as	  the	  demographic	  dividend,	  exemplified	  by	  East	  Asia	  in	  the	  last	  30	  
years	  and	  possibly	  starting	  in	  some	  African	  countries	  at	  present.	  
HIV/AIDS	  has	  had	  profound	  effects	  on	  population	  structures	  in	  many	  African	  countries	  over	  the	  last	  
40	  years	  and	  –together	  with	  the	  growth	  of	  urban	  employment	  in	  some	  regions-­‐	  has	  also	  resulted	  in	  
the	  strong	  ‘feminization’	  of	  African	  agriculture.	  This	  has	  profound	  implications	  for	  the	  future	  
development	  of	  agriculture.	  
Dense	  populations,	  as	  in	  China	  and	  India,	  put	  increased	  pressure	  on	  land	  and	  water	  resources.	  The	  
institution	  of	  inheritance	  has	  important	  influence	  on	  the	  division	  of	  land.	  Primogeniture	  ensures	  that	  
the	  entire	  estate	  is	  passed	  to	  the	  first	  born,	  while	  equal	  inheritance	  leads	  to	  the	  subdivision	  of	  land	  
into	  smaller	  and	  smaller	  plots.	  
Demographic,	  social,	  and	  economic	  drivers	  are	  described	  at:	  
http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/demog-­‐social-­‐econ-­‐eric-­‐kemp-­‐benedict	  
Politics	  
Political	  discourse	  occurs	  at	  the	  national	  and	  local	  level.	  Politics	  underwrites	  the	  formation	  and	  
working	  of	  institutions	  which	  influence,	  for	  example,	  individualistic	  or	  collaborative	  behaviours.	  
Political	  change	  is	  a	  current	  topic	  with	  the	  dramatic	  changes	  of	  the	  “Arab	  spring”	  consisting	  of	  
regime	  changes	  in	  Tunisia,	  Egypt,	  and	  Libya	  and	  continuing	  unrest	  in	  Syria	  and	  several	  Gulf	  states.	  
The	  final	  outcomes	  remain	  unclear	  (January,	  2012),	  but	  the	  trend	  is	  to	  replace	  repressive	  
authoritarian	  regimes	  with	  some	  form	  of	  elected	  government.	  There	  is	  internal	  civil	  conflict	  in	  
Colombia	  in	  the	  Andes	  basins,	  and	  Pakistan	  in	  the	  Indus.	  
International	  dialogue	  is	  an	  important	  driver,	  with	  some	  successes,	  such	  as	  the	  1987	  Montreal	  
Protocol	  on	  Substances	  that	  Deplete	  the	  OzoneLayer,	  while	  others	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Nations	  
Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  are	  less	  successful.	  
At	  the	  national	  level	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  a	  political	  discourse	  that	  recognizes	  the	  development	  
processes	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  impacts	  on	  the	  ecosystem	  services	  that	  support	  it.	  
At	  the	  local	  level,	  politics	  underwrite	  the	  nature	  of	  arrangements	  between	  groups	  sharing	  resources.	  	  
For	  more	  detailed	  information	  about	  political	  drivers,	  visit:	  
http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/political-­‐drivers-­‐cpwfgd-­‐workshop-­‐sept-­‐2011	  	  
	  
Global	  climate	  change	  
The	  important	  consideration	  is	  future	  variation	  in	  relation	  to	  current	  variability.	  
Temperatures	  will	  increase,	  more	  in	  absolute	  terms	  at	  high	  latitudes	  than	  in	  the	  tropics.	  Higher	  
temperatures	  will	  increase	  evapo-­‐transpiration,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  will	  increase	  water	  demands.	  Higher	  
temperatures	  will	  also	  have	  independent	  effects	  on	  plant	  performance,	  such	  as	  reduced	  pollination	  
and	  in	  extreme	  cases,	  crop	  failure.	  Technical	  fixes	  may	  be	  possible	  for	  some	  crops,	  such	  as	  rice	  that	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flowers	  earlier	  in	  the	  day	  to	  avoid	  damaging	  high	  temperatures	  at	  pollination,	  breeding	  beans	  that	  
are	  less	  sensitive	  to	  high	  temperature	  damage	  of	  the	  pollen	  tube	  by	  crossing	  with	  species	  of	  beans	  
that	  are	  less	  sensitive.	  
Rainfall	  may	  increase	  in	  the	  tropics	  and	  lessen	  in	  some	  temperate	  regions.	  There	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  
temporal	  changes	  with	  increases	  for	  a	  number	  of	  decades	  followed	  by	  decreases	  (or	  vice	  versa),	  
which	  will	  require	  continuous	  adaptation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  farmers.	  
In	  practice,	  the	  main	  implications	  of	  climate	  change	  are	  likely	  to	  be:	  
• Shifts	  in	  growing	  environment	  of	  major	  crops	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  increase	  in	  temperature	  
and/or	  modified	  rainfall	  patterns.	  In	  some	  areas	  (e.g..	  Southern	  Africa)	  these	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  
substantial.	  In	  the	  Andes,	  the	  picture	  comprises	  both	  losses	  and	  gains.	  
• Changes	  in	  water	  balance,	  including	  increased	  incidence	  of	  extreme	  flood	  or	  drought	  events.	  
Most	  of	  the	  basins	  studied	  are	  expected	  to	  experience	  increased	  rainfall,	  largely	  off-­‐set	  by	  
increased	  temperature.	  Of	  the	  ten	  basins	  studied	  by	  the	  BFPs,	  the	  Limpopo	  alone	  is	  
expected	  to	  experience	  a	  substantial	  decline	  in	  rainfall	  and	  consequent	  decrease	  of	  flow.	  
• Increased	  uncertainty,	  partially	  as	  a	  result	  of	  greater	  variability	  of	  climate	  events.	  The	  
practical	  effect	  of	  this	  is	  a	  constraint	  on	  long-­‐term	  investment,	  additional	  obstacles	  to	  
negotiated	  settlements	  over	  water	  resources,	  and	  disruption	  of	  emerging	  supply	  chains	  on	  
which	  high	  productivity	  depends.	  
See	  “climate	  change	  and	  environmental	  drivers”:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/climate-­‐change-­‐
and-­‐environmental-­‐drivers-­‐cpwfgd-­‐workshop-­‐sept-­‐2011	  
Innovation	  and	  technology	  
These	  are	  two	  different	  concepts.	  
Innovation	  is	  bottom-­‐up,	  influenced	  by	  the	  institutional	  structure	  of	  the	  community	  and	  its	  
willingness	  to	  accept	  change.	  Innovation	  is	  an	  on-­‐going	  process	  in	  which	  people	  adapt	  technologies	  
to	  their	  own	  particular	  needs,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  provide	  tailored	  solutions	  to	  local	  problems.	  	  
Technology	  is	  largely	  top	  down	  and	  in	  many	  instances	  is	  imported	  from	  outside	  the	  community.	  It	  
relies	  on	  invention,	  which	  is	  different	  from	  innovation.	  Its	  influence	  can	  be	  profound	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  rapid	  adoption	  of	  cellular	  telephones	  in	  developing	  countries.	  But	  not	  all	  technologies	  are	  readily	  
adopted	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  genetically-­‐improved	  maize	  varieties	  in	  Mexico.	  
Technological	  change:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/technological-­‐change-­‐cpwf-­‐gd-­‐workshop-­‐
september-­‐2011	  
Drivers	  in	  Basins	  	  
The	  following	  presentations	  provide	  rich	  views	  	  of	  drivers	  in	  basins	  by	  scientists	  from	  the	  CPWF	  basin	  
development	  challenges	  (BDCs).	  	  
Mekong:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/mekong-­‐drivers-­‐of-­‐change-­‐cpwf-­‐gd-­‐workshop-­‐sept-­‐2011	  	  
Volta:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/volta-­‐drivers-­‐of-­‐change-­‐cpwf-­‐gd-­‐workshop-­‐sept-­‐2011	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Limpopo:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/limpopo-­‐drivers-­‐of-­‐change-­‐cpwf-­‐gd-­‐workshop-­‐sept-­‐
2011	  	  
At	  IFWF3,	  November,	  2011	  
Andes:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/gdtwg-­‐session-­‐posters-­‐ifwf	  	  
Ganges:	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3.	  Building	  scenarios:	  How	  do	  drivers	  act	  together	  to	  impel	  change	  in	  
basins?	  	  
Scenario	  methodology2	  
Scenario	  thinking	  is	  a	  disciplined	  method	  of	  imagining	  possible	  futures	  by	  identifying	  and	  combining	  
known	  trends	  and	  uncertainties.	  The	  idea	  is	  not	  to	  try	  to	  predict	  the	  future	  (this	  would	  never	  give	  
you	  any	  unsurprising	  scenarios),	  but	  rather	  explore	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  futures,	  irrespective	  of	  
their	  probability.	  Scenarios	  can	  therefore	  be	  used	  to	  identify	  early-­‐warning	  signals,	  indicators,	  or	  
thresholds	  of	  negative	  outcomes.	  For	  the	  CPWF	  in	  particular,	  it	  can	  help	  us	  assess	  the	  robustness	  of	  
our	  core	  competencies,	  generate	  better	  strategic	  options,	  and	  evaluate	  risk/return	  profile	  of	  options	  
in	  view	  of	  opportunities.	  	  
We	  have	  decided	  to	  base	  our	  methodology	  on	  Shoemaker’s	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  analysis	  of	  the	  FST	  process	  
(see	  figure	  at	  the	  right).	  
However,	  we	  chose	  to	  experiment	  with	  a	  
much	  more	  visual	  version	  of	  it,	  which	  has	  
the	  advantage	  of	  more	  creative	  pairings	  
of	  trends	  and	  uncertainties.	  Our	  global	  
approach	  allows	  for	  vastly	  different	  
scenarios,	  each	  taking	  into	  account	  
different	  stakeholders,	  trends,	  
uncertainties,	  and	  wildcards,	  and	  
weighting	  these	  factors	  differently.	  
Moreover,	  our	  methodology	  produces	  
outputs	  at	  each	  level	  that	  can	  be	  saved	  
and	  even	  recycled/introduced	  in	  
secondary	  FST	  exercises.	  	  
In	  our	  version,	  the	  group	  is	  facilitated	  
towards	  identifying	  stakeholders	  (triangular	  cards),	  trends	  (rectangular	  cards)	  and	  then	  uncertainties	  
or	  wildcards	  (circular	  cards).	  Trends	  are	  ongoing	  patterns	  that	  all	  unanimously	  agree	  will	  continue	  in	  
the	  future,	  e.g.	  population	  growth	  in	  India.	  Uncertainties	  are	  best	  posed	  as	  questions	  regarding	  
patterns	  that	  group	  members	  are	  unsure	  or	  disagree	  about,	  e.g.	  will	  biofuels	  become	  a	  major	  player	  
in	  energy	  security?	  Wildcards	  are	  perhaps	  unlikely	  events	  that	  would	  be	  game-­‐changers,	  e.g.	  an	  AIDS	  
vaccine	  that	  could	  affect	  African	  population	  patterns	  and	  thus	  food	  demand.	  All	  these	  paper	  cards	  
are	  color-­‐coded	  by	  driver	  (blue	  =	  political/institutional,	  green	  =	  environmental,	  yellow	  =	  economic,	  
orange	  =	  demographic/social,	  pink	  =	  technological)	  
After	  being	  given	  time	  to	  identify	  rules	  of	  interaction,	  quantitative	  evidence,	  etc.,	  the	  group	  is	  then	  
instructed	  to	  combine	  different	  shapes	  and	  colors	  to	  create	  cogent	  narratives	  of	  potential	  futures.	  As	  
the	  factors	  the	  cards	  represent	  can	  play	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  role	  in	  a	  given	  scenario,	  they	  can	  be	  given	  
numeric	  weights	  (1-­‐5),	  which	  can	  be	  beneficial	  (+)	  or	  detrimental	  (-­‐)	  towards	  the	  goal	  (for	  CPWF,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  More	  information	  on	  Future	  Scenario	  Thinking	  [FST]	  can	  be	  found	  at:	  
http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/introduction-­‐to-­‐future-­‐scenarios-­‐thinking-­‐theory-­‐and-­‐exercise-­‐cpwf-­‐gd-­‐
workshop-­‐sept-­‐2011	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water/food	  security).	  Summing	  the	  values	  of	  the	  different	  cards	  in	  a	  given	  scenario	  then	  give	  you	  a	  
sense	  of	  how	  “good”	  or	  “bad”	  the	  overall	  scenario	  is	  for	  you	  (the	  CPWF).	  These	  scenarios	  are	  then	  
re-­‐checked	  for	  internal	  consistency,	  more	  research	  is	  done	  to	  provide	  better	  quantitative	  (or	  
qualitative/anecdotal)	  support	  before	  final	  scenarios	  are	  produced.	  	  
At	  a	  small	  Global	  Drivers	  workshop	  with	  mostly	  BFP	  invitees,	  Charlotte	  Lau	  and	  Amanda	  Harding	  led	  
a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  scenario-­‐thinking	  exercise.	  The	  workshop	  participants	  were	  split	  up	  into	  teams	  of	  
two,	  representing	  5	  of	  the	  6	  basins.	  The	  groups	  were	  given	  about	  3.5	  hours	  to	  go	  through	  an	  
abbreviated	  version	  of	  the	  exercise,	  with	  each	  team	  coming	  up	  with	  2-­‐3	  different	  possible	  future	  
scenarios.	  The	  group	  shared	  some	  of	  the	  scenarios	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  exercise,	  and	  received	  feedback.	  
This	  methodology	  and	  the	  resulting	  scenarios	  were	  presented	  at	  IFWF3	  in	  Pretoria	  in	  November,	  
2011.	  	  
While	  the	  workshop	  FST	  exercise	  proved	  the	  potential	  worth	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  exercise,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  
larger,	  more	  diverse	  groups	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  build	  more	  meaningful	  scenarios.	  Moreover,	  the	  
facilitator	  ought	  to	  do	  more	  background	  research	  and	  supply	  these	  data	  to	  group	  members	  before	  
the	  meeting.	  And	  lastly,	  with	  more	  people	  participating,	  more	  disagreement	  is	  to	  be	  expected,	  and	  it	  
is	  likely	  that	  at	  least	  one	  full	  day	  would	  be	  necessary.	  
Scenario	  building:	  An	  example	  
We	  presented	  the	  following	  (simplified)	  example	  of	  NYC	  housing,	  where	  the	  focal	  question	  was:	  
“How	  will	  rent	  costs	  and	  housing	  demographics	  look	  in	  2020?”	  The	  exercise	  was	  conducted	  by	  an	  
anti-­‐gentrification	  NGO	  advocating	  affordable	  housing	  for	  the	  poor.	  According	  to	  the	  methodology,	  
the	  following	  were	  identified:	  
	  
Stakeholders:	  	  
• NYC	  housing	  authority	  
• NYC	  government	  






• City	  population	  growth	  
• Increasing	  cost	  of	  living	  and	  transport	  in	  general	  
• Security	  concerns	  (earlier:	  crimes,	  now:	  terrorism)	  
	  
Uncertainties:	  
• Will	  wealthy	  non-­‐natives	  continue	  to	  move	  in,	  willing	  to	  pay	  $$?	  
• Will	  rent	  control	  continue	  to	  protect	  affordable	  housing?	  
• Will	  outer	  boroughs	  move	  towards	  apartment-­‐style	  housing,	  over	  houses?	  
• Will	  the	  economic	  crisis/housing	  crash	  continue	  to	  affect	  prices?	  
	  
Wildcards:	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• Series	  of	  really	  awful	  terrorist	  attacks	  that	  destroys	  the	  economy	  and	  prevents	  people	  from	  
moving	  to	  NY	  
	  
Rules	  of	  interaction:	  
• NYC	  legislature	  cares	  more	  about	  renters	  than	  landlords	  (likely	  to	  keep	  rent	  control).	  All	  





The	  Bridge	  and	  Tunnel	  Answer 
The	  economic	  crisis	  and	  security	  concerns	  have	  no	  real	  effect	  
on	  people	  in-­‐migrating	  to	  New	  York,	  and	  in	  fact	  only	  results	  in	  
the	  wealthy	  coming.	  This	  pushes	  up	  the	  costs	  of	  all	  non-­‐rent-­‐
controlled	  apartments.	  (Rent	  control	  remains,	  as	  Democrats	  
remain	  in	  power.)	  Manhattan	  becomes	  fully	  saturated.	  As	  a	  
result,	  gentrification	  continues.	  The	  Jehovah’s	  Witnesses	  sell	  
out	  their	  vast	  holdings	  in	  downtown	  Brooklyn,	  releasing	  
significant	  land	  for	  apartments.	  The	  government	  pushes	  out	  
well-­‐located	  projects	  e.g.	  in	  Queens	  and	  lower	  Manhattan,	  to	  
further	  out	  in	  Brooklyn	  or	  Staten	  Island	  (free	  ferry	  service).	  
Poor	  communities	  move	  out	  to	  pockets	  of	  New	  Jersey	  and	  
Connecticut,	  and	  increasingly	  live	  in	  over-­‐stuffed	  apartment	  
buildings	  in	  Staten	  Island,	  the	  Bronx,	  and	  distant	  Brooklyn.	  In	  
response	  to	  housing	  demand,	  Queens	  turns	  increasingly	  to	  
apartment-­‐style	  housing	  over	  individual	  houses.	  The	  MTA	  
raises	  transport	  costs	  to	  extend	  the	  subway	  to	  more	  
neighborhoods	  in	  Queens,	  making	  this	  a	  viable	  option	  for	  
commuters.	  This	  reduces	  the	  housing	  crunch,	  preventing	  rents	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Scenarios	  from	  each	  basin	  
ANDES	  
“Worst	  case”	  
Continued	  global	  depression	  hits	  national	  economies	  in	  the	  region	  which	  have	  become	  
dependent	  on	  minerals	  and	  off-­‐farm	  income.	  Starved	  of	  revenue,	  resources	  for	  rural	  development	  
are	  unavailable,	  leading	  to	  sustained	  under-­‐investment	  in	  rural	  development.	  Rural	  areas	  become	  
increasingly	  separated	  from	  urban	  areas.	  Urban	  unemployment	  remains	  stubbornly	  high,	  yet	  
migration	  continues	  to	  urban	  areas,	  leading	  to	  disaffection	  and	  political	  unrest.	  Major	  upheavals	  in	  
national	  politics	  follow,	  coupled	  with	  polarization	  regionally	  that	  leads	  to	  conflict	  between	  politicians	  
[many	  populist],	  who	  swing	  hard	  to	  either	  left	  or	  right.	  FDI,	  the	  mainstay	  of	  economic	  growth	  is	  
reduced.	  Opportunities	  for	  the	  green	  economy	  are	  frozen	  internationally	  and	  within	  country.	  
Influence	  of	  environmental	  NGOs	  	  decreases,	  leading	  to	  poor	  practice	  and	  lack	  of	  control	  of	  FDI,	  
which	  leads	  to	  abuses	  and	  risks	  to	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  rural	  poor	  who	  depend	  on	  it.	  Rural	  
poverty	  worsens,	  pressure	  on	  the	  environment	  decreases	  but	  so	  does	  long-­‐term	  investment	  and	  
legislation	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  environment	  also	  decreases.	  
Severe	  climate	  change	  impacts	  niche	  production	  areas,	  rural	  stakeholders	  who	  are	  
dependent	  on	  these	  are	  unable	  to	  adapt.	  Increased	  variation	  of	  rainfall	  leads	  to	  greater	  risk	  of	  
landslides,	  flooding	  and	  soil	  erosion.	  	  
“Best	  case”	  
Sustained	  growth	  of	  the	  economy,	  including	  mining,	  but	  coupled	  with	  growth	  of	  the	  green	  
economy	  and	  which	  sustains	  the	  development	  of	  ESs	  [internal	  =	  water	  and	  external	  =	  biodiversity	  
and	  C].	  Growth	  of	  markets	  for	  ESs	  are	  enabled	  by	  proper	  valuation.	  Valuation	  of	  ESs	  enhances	  
regulation	  and	  distribution	  of	  revenues.	  This	  also	  impacts	  the	  characteristic	  of	  FDI	  (including	  
investment	  in	  mining).	  FDI	  is	  encouraged,	  leading	  to	  risks	  for	  ecosystems,	  but	  these	  are	  mediated	  by	  
improved	  legislation	  and	  pressure	  from	  civil	  society.	  	  	  
Population	  growth	  slows.	  Improved	  investment	  in	  rural	  services	  and	  education	  supports	  
population	  stabilization,	  though	  urbanization	  continues.	  Through	  expansion	  of	  supply	  chains	  for	  
niche	  market,	  development	  of	  markets	  for	  ESs,	  rural	  prosperity	  improves.	  This	  is	  enhanced	  by	  
improvements	  in	  access	  to	  ICTs	  and	  transport	  infrastructure.	  	  
Political	  stability,	  supported	  by	  successful	  international	  cooperation	  within	  Andean	  
countries,	  including	  open	  markets	  underwrites	  a	  steady	  growth	  of	  high-­‐value	  products.	  International	  
policy	  reduces	  the	  incidence	  of	  illicit	  crops,	  leading	  to	  a	  decline	  of	  political	  violence.	  	  
Adaptation	  to	  climate	  change	  is	  enhanced	  by	  Improvements	  in	  governance,	  international	  
cooperation	  and	  diversity	  in	  the	  the	  rural	  economy.	  	  
LIMPOPO	  
We	  thought	  that	  both	  scenarios	  would	  be	  found	  in	  the	  basin,	  due	  to	  climatic	  variability.	  	  They	  will	  
play	  out	  in	  an	  interesting	  mosaic.	  
“Positive	  scenario”	  
Mining	  and	  industrialization	  leads	  to	  the	  continued	  feminization	  of	  agriculture.	  Industrialization	  and	  
population	  growth	  leads	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  demand	  for	  food,	  including	  meat	  and	  increasing	  land	  
scarcity.	  Market	  opportunities	  for	  livestock	  products	  continue	  to	  increase	  at	  local,	  regional	  and	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international	  level.	  Land	  scarcity	  and	  increased	  profitability	  lead	  to	  intensification	  and	  increased	  
mechanization.	  Initial	  investments	  in	  mechanization	  are	  made	  from	  profits	  from	  livestock.	  The	  
changes	  are	  supported	  by	  a	  political	  process	  that	  that	  brings	  in	  land	  reform	  that	  gives	  land	  to	  small-­‐
scale	  farmers,	  together	  with	  infrastructure	  development	  to	  improve	  links	  to	  market.	  Economic	  
growth	  and	  market	  development	  is	  furthered	  by	  increasing	  SADC	  integration,	  in	  particular	  about	  
infrastructure	  development	  and	  opening	  access	  to	  markets.	  LIMCOM	  gains	  traction	  allowing	  better	  
and	  more	  equitable	  use	  of	  Limpopo	  water	  resources.	  
Will	  hold	  for	  SA,	  Bots	  and	  Zim,	  less	  for	  Moz	  
“Negative	  scenario”	  
In	  certain	  places	  climatic	  variability	  and	  reduced	  rainfall	  mean	  that	  agriculture	  cannot	  respond	  to	  
market	  demand	  and	  the	  opportunity	  offered	  by	  livestock	  production.	  This	  is	  in	  part	  because	  of	  
labour	  shortage	  due	  to	  out-­‐migration	  to	  work	  in	  mines,	  HIV-­‐AIDS,	  feminization	  of	  agriculture	  and	  an	  
aging	  population.	  Reduced	  rainfall	  increases	  risk,	  which	  means	  investments	  in	  mechanization	  are	  not	  
viable	  despite	  government	  promotion	  of	  labour	  saving	  solutions.	  Government	  investment	  goes	  to	  
buy	  food	  from	  abroad	  rather	  than	  spending	  it	  on	  infrastructure	  or	  social	  security.	  Land	  reform	  is	  
thrown	  at	  the	  problem,	  but	  this	  fails	  because	  of	  labour	  shortage	  and	  low	  returns	  to	  farming.	  	  
May	  not	  hold	  entirely	  for	  Moz	  
MEKONG	  
	  
Scenario	   1	   	   2	   	   3	   	  
Power	  demand	   Increases	   	   Increases	   	   Increases	   	  
Dams	   Get	  built	   	   Get	  built	   	   Get	  built	   	  
Dams	  designed	   Not	  fish	  friendly	   	   Fish	  friendly/	  sediment	  
friendly/	  plays	  well	  with	  
others	  
	   Not	  fish	  friendly	   	  
Downstream	  
fisheries	  
Obliterated	   	   Maintained	   	   Obliterated	   	  
Livelihoods	  changes	   Remittances/	  
migration	  
	   Rural	  +	  urban	  mixed	   	   Rural	  +	  urban	  mixed	   	  
Corporatization	  of	  
NR/farm/fish	  
Fairly	  full	   	   Only	  partial	   	   Partial	  and	  partly	  
reversed	  
	  
Social	  unrest	   Minimal	   	   Minimal	   	   All	  hell	  breaks	  loose	   	  
Rise	  of	  civil	  society	   Engaging	  –	  
advocacy/	  policy	  





Private	   	   Private	  or	  public	  –	  DBs	   	   Private	   	  
Corruption	   Skyrockets	   	   Under	  control	   	   Skyrockets	   	  
Hydrology	  changes	   Less	  pulsing,	  more	  
dry	  season	  flows	  
	   Some	  pulsing,	  
environmental	  flows	  
	   Less	  pulsing,	  more	  DS	  
flows	  
	  
Demand	  for	  power	  
collapses	  
ES	  not	  maintained	   	   ES	  maintenance	  reduced	  	   	   ES	  not	  maintained	   	  
Nutrition	   Less	  protein	  
available	  for	  poor	  
	   More	  protein	  available	   	   Less	  protein	  available	  
for	  poor	  
	  
Final	  result	   Surrender	   	   Peaceful	  coexistence	   	   Water	  war	   	  
	  
Comparison	  across	  3	  scenarios:	  	  
In	  three	  scenarios,	  power	  demand	  from	  Thailand	  and	  Vietnam	  are	  major	  drivers	  affecting	  the	  Mekong	  
resulting	  in	  a	  sharp	  increase	  in	  hydropower	  development.	  In	  S1	  and	  S3,	  dams	  designed	  for	  the	  Basin	  are	  not	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fish	  friendly	  resulting	  in	  obliteration	  of	  the	  downstream	  fisheries.	  In	  S2,	  dams	  are	  built	  with	  innovative	  fish	  
and	  sediment	  friendly	  technologies,	  enabling	  the	  maintenance	  of	  fisheries.	  Local	  farmers/fishers	  livelihoods	  
continually	  change.	  In	  S1,	  remittances	  and	  migration	  factor	  strongly	  whereas	  in	  S2/S3,	  livelihoods	  are	  
largely	  a	  mixture	  of	  rural	  and	  urban.	  The	  private	  sector	  control	  fish	  and	  farming	  in	  S1	  and	  only	  partially	  in	  
S2/S3.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  social	  unrest	  in	  S3	  breaks	  out	  across	  the	  Basin.	  Whilst	  economic	  development	  has	  
skyrocketed,	  civil	  society	  has	  continued	  to	  develop.	  In	  S1,	  civil	  society	  decides	  to	  engage	  with	  decision-­‐
makers	  and	  advocate	  for	  change.	  In	  S2,	  CSOs	  create	  partnerships	  and	  in	  S3	  protest	  violently.	  Corruption	  is	  
rampant	  in	  S1/S3	  but	  maintained	  in	  S2	  because	  of	  investment	  by	  the	  MDBs.	  Hydrologically,	  flood	  pulsing	  
decreases;	  dry	  season	  flows	  increase	  and	  ecosystem	  services	  are	  lost.	  S2	  sees	  some	  pulsing	  resulting	  in	  
environmental	  flows	  and	  ecosystem	  services	  are	  maintained.	  The	  nutritional	  needs	  of	  society	  are	  of	  great	  
concern,	  however	  not	  on	  the	  radar	  of	  investors.	  S1/S3	  result	  in	  less	  animal	  protein	  availability,	  whilst	  in	  S2	  
more	  protein	  is	  provided	  due	  to	  environmental	  flows.	  In	  conclusion,	  a	  water	  war	  breaks	  out	  in	  S3;	  
stakeholders	  in	  S1	  decide	  to	  surrender,	  as	  none	  of	  their	  efforts	  have	  been	  successful.	  Stakeholders	  in	  S2	  
coexist	  peacefully	  and	  ultimately	  change	  the	  development	  trajectory	  of	  the	  Mekong.	  
“Scenario	  1”	  (written	  out):	  	  
Power	  demand	  in	  Thailand	  and	  Vietnam	  leads	  to	  a	  sharp	  increase	  in	  hydropower	  development.	  Dams	  
designed	  for	  the	  basin	  are	  not	  fish-­‐friendly,	  resulting	  in	  the	  obliteration	  of	  downstream	  fisheries.	  
Widespread	  private	  sector	  corporatization	  of	  fish	  and	  farming	  occurs.	  Local	  farmers’	  and	  fishers’	  livelihoods	  
change,	  and	  remittances	  and	  migration	  factor	  in	  strongly.	  As	  the	  economy	  develops	  quickly,	  civil	  society	  
does	  too—and	  CSOs	  begin	  to	  engage	  with	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  advocate	  for	  change.	  Corruption	  skyrockets.	  
Hydrologically,	  flood	  pulsing	  decreases;	  dry	  season	  flows	  increase,	  and	  ecosystem	  services	  are	  lost.	  The	  
nutritional	  needs	  of	  society	  are	  of	  great	  concern,	  as	  less	  fish	  mean	  less	  protein	  available	  for	  the	  poor.	  
However,	  as	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  matter	  to	  investors,	  stakeholders	  decided	  to	  surrender	  the	  fight.	  
NILE	  
“Narrative	  1.	  Best	  case	  scenario”	  
Foreign	  direct	  investment	  on	  sustainable	  hydropower	  development	  in	  cool	  upstream	  countries	  
through	  building	  sustainable	  water	  storage	  facilities	  in	  the	  Nile	  will	  create	  the	  urgently-­‐needed	  
energy	  for	  local	  industries.	  FDI	  will	  promote	  benefit	  sharing	  and	  increase	  access	  to	  rural	  farmers,	  
while	  creating	  water	  access	  for	  irrigation	  for	  downstream	  communities	  once	  power	  is	  generated	  .	  
Local	  institutions	  will	  be	  strengthened	  and	  there	  will	  be	  an	  increased	  flow	  of	  knowledge	  and	  
interventions.	  This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  situations	  where	  global	  climate	  change	  will	  increase	  
temperatures	  and	  aggravate	  unproductive	  evapo-­‐transpiration	  in	  warmer,	  downstream	  countries.	  
This	  will	  have	  a	  positive	  implication	  on	  public-­‐private	  partnership,	  but	  also	  farmers	  will	  start	  to	  adopt	  
it	  recognizing	  the	  benefits.	  This	  will	  also	  facilitate	  environment	  friendly	  tourism,	  fisheries	  and	  other	  
users,	  which	  could	  benefit	  the	  rural	  population	  and	  the	  wider	  public.	  	  
	  “Narrative	  2.	  Worst	  case	  scenario”	  
In	  a	  context	  of	  regional	  power	  imbalances,	  and	  against	  a	  background	  of	  global	  economic	  uncertainty,	  
FDI	  driven	  by	  self-­‐interest	  leads	  to	  poor	  domestic	  economic	  development	  characterized	  by	  inequity	  
and	  land	  grabbing.	  Food	  and	  fertilizer	  prices	  rise,	  while	  a	  Nile	  pact	  is	  far	  away.	  Countries	  strive	  for	  
water	  security	  in	  a	  desperate	  attempt	  to	  keep	  control	  of	  this	  increasingly	  scarce	  resource.	  	  Domestic	  
political	  instability	  is	  one	  ‘response’.	  	  There	  is	  no	  effective	  responsive	  governance	  and	  water	  
competition	  and	  scarcity	  increase,	  both	  up-­‐	  and	  downstream	  and	  between	  different	  users.	  Farmers	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cannot	  adapt,	  and	  deforestation	  and	  land	  degradation	  worsen.	  The	  result	  is	  one	  of	  increased	  poverty	  
and	  inequality,	  and	  poor	  adaptation	  to	  climate	  shocks	  
VOLTA	  
“	  Too	  Hot	  –	  Too	  Crowded	  –	  Too	  Corrupt	  	  (climate	  variability,	  population	  growth	  and	  
corruption)”	  
Consistent	  rise	  in	  temperatures	  and	  unpredictable	  rainfall	  patterns	  alongside	  3%	  population	  growth	  
in	  the	  basin	  force	  rural	  populations	  initially	  to	  marginal	  lands	  and	  increasingly	  into	  urban	  slum	  areas.	  
This,	  coupled	  with	  acquisition	  of	  remaining	  productive	  land	  by	  foreign	  investors	  paying	  off	  
government	  officials,	  see	  poverty	  increase	  greatly	  in	  the	  Basin	  over	  40	  years,	  despite	  NGO	  and	  
researchers’	  continuing	  scattered	  projects.	  
“	  Finding	  alternatives:	  from	  gloom	  to	  glory”	  
Temporary	  	  urban	  migration	  imposed	  by	  basin	  stresses	  and	  shocks,	  raise	  the	  possibility	  of	  diverse	  
livelihoods	  options,	  including	  access	  to	  micro	  finance,	  increased	  demand	  for	  alternative	  products	  
and	  markets.	  These	  are	  facilitated	  by	  civil	  society	  initiatives	  and	  effective	  government	  and	  regional	  
subsidies	  and	  so	  offset	  some	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  climate	  variability.	  
“	  Regime	  Change	  –	  Resilient	  Communities”	  
Following	  a	  period	  of	  instability,	  civil	  society	  and	  youth	  mobilises	  to	  bring	  about	  democratic	  
representational	  government,	  seeing	  a	  shift	  in	  regional	  and	  foreign	  investment	  patterns	  as	  well	  as	  
improved	  equitable	  Basin	  regulatory	  frameworks	  and	  resource	  coordination	  and	  conflict	  resolution	  
structures.	  Small	  holders	  in	  rural	  areas	  mobilise	  themselves,	  improve	  productivity	  and	  their	  incomes	  
seeing	  less	  imperative	  for	  urban	  migration.	  
	  “Innovative	  technologies”	  
Big	  dam	  development	  results	  in	  regulation	  of	  flows	  in	  the	  basin,	  economic	  growth	  and	  investment	  
through	  energy	  exported	  across	  the	  region	  as	  well	  as	  increased	  irrigation	  complimenting	  small	  
reservoirs.	  This	  in	  turn	  further	  supports	  small	  scale	  farmer-­‐led	  technological	  inputs	  and	  helps	  
diversify	  production,	  which	  buffers	  them	  from	  variations	  in	  commodity	  prices	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  
climate	  change.	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4.	  Responding	  to	  drivers:	  Deliberative	  processes	  of	  change	  	  
We	  now	  consider	  the	  deliberative	  response	  to	  drivers:	  what	  decision-­‐makers	  do	  when	  they	  are	  
aware	  of	  change	  in	  river	  basins.	  We	  consider	  the	  way	  people	  respond	  to	  global	  drivers	  to	  identify	  
how	  research	  can	  support	  ‘better’	  decision-­‐making.	  We	  represent	  the	  process	  in	  the	  figure	  below.	  
	  
The	  process	  of	  responding	  to	  drivers	  
Uncertainty	  prevents	  timely	  response:	  
Drivers	  act	  on	  conditions	  and	  change	  them.	  If	  the	  change	  process	  appears	  so	  simple,	  why	  does	  it	  not	  
occur?	  People	  do	  not	  respond	  because	  of	  four	  different	  types	  of	  uncertainty:	  Is	  the	  change	  
recognized?	  Is	  the	  change	  important	  enough	  to	  respond,	  and	  is	  response	  possible?	  What	  responses	  
are	  appropriate	  and	  what	  are	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  responses?	  
a).	  What	  drivers	  occur?	  
We	  describe	  six	  classes	  of	  drivers	  in	  section	  2.	  This	  classification	  is	  relatively	  arbitrary	  and	  is	  based	  on	  
the	  advice	  of	  specialists	  from	  the	  six	  river	  basins.	  In	  reality,	  the	  scope	  of	  drivers	  is	  infinite,	  affecting	  
all	  aspects	  of	  social,	  economic	  and	  ecological	  activity.	  	  
b).	  Is	  change	  recognizable?	  
Many	  of	  the	  changes	  are	  recognized	  retrospectively,	  from	  evidence	  and	  inference.	  For	  example,	  
climate	  change	  has	  been	  observed	  for	  decades,	  but	  its	  anthropogenic	  cause	  only	  relatively	  recently.	  
All	  of	  the	  drivers	  described	  have	  been	  researched	  extensively.	  However,	  we	  know	  much	  less	  about	  
their	  specific	  impacts,	  which	  consequently	  remain	  of	  unrecognized	  importance.	  
Drivers	  inﬂuence	  
condisons	  
Changes	  are	  recognized	  
Changes	  considered	  
important	  and	  acsonable	  
Consequences	  of	  acsons	  
(including	  ‘let’s	  ignore	  
this’)	  are	  considered	  	  
Acson.	  
Is	  now	  next	  generason	  of	  
driver	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Analysis	  should	  clarify	  this	  recognition.	  However,	  recognition	  is	  a	  cognitive	  process	  that	  goes	  beyond	  
the	  mere	  provision	  of	  information	  and	  requires	  the	  active	  engagement	  of	  critical	  stakeholders.	  This	  
process	  resides	  clearly	  within	  the	  BDCs.	  	  
c)	  Is	  the	  change	  important	  and	  actionable?	  
Climate	  change	  is	  now	  recognized	  as	  a	  reality	  (almost)	  universally	  amongst	  senior	  politicians.	  Most,	  
however	  feel	  unable	  to	  respond	  because	  of	  domestic	  political	  realities.	  Politicians	  from	  poorer	  
countries	  are	  unable	  to	  respond,	  even	  if	  political	  realities	  permitted.	  
The	  realization	  that	  change	  is	  important	  nearly	  always	  depends	  on	  a	  long-­‐term	  mindset	  because	  
most	  major	  drivers	  are	  only	  perceptible	  over	  the	  longer	  term.	  FDI	  and	  food-­‐price	  shocks	  appear	  to	  
be	  the	  exceptions,	  but	  they	  are	  the	  consequence	  of	  long-­‐term	  increases	  in	  food	  demand,	  combined	  
with	  the	  lack	  of	  investment	  in	  agriculture.	  	  
d)	  What	  are	  the	  consequences	  of	  change?	  	  	  
Consider	  the	  Ganges	  delta,	  currently	  experiencing	  increases	  in	  salinity	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  changes	  
in	  flow	  patterns	  upstream,	  and	  rising	  sea	  levels	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  global	  climate	  change.	  What	  will	  
happen	  if	  nobody	  responds?	  When	  will	  problems	  become	  unavoidable?	  At	  what	  point	  will	  the	  
polders	  cease	  to	  protect	  from	  sea	  level	  rise?	  Can	  the	  changes	  in	  water	  quality	  be	  exploited	  for	  
prawns	  and	  rice	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Vietnamese	  farmers	  do?	  	  
In	  all	  cases,	  the	  consequences	  involve	  people,	  different	  groups	  of	  people,	  some	  of	  whom	  have	  a	  
political	  voice,	  some	  who	  do	  not.	  The	  consequences	  are	  viewed	  by	  politicians	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
perceived	  value	  of	  change.	  In	  the	  Mekong,	  changes	  to	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  the	  millions	  of	  people	  who	  
relied	  on	  aquatic	  system	  were	  previously	  regarded	  as	  less	  valuable	  than	  the	  gains	  offered	  (to	  fewer	  
people)	  by	  a	  massive	  expansion	  of	  hydropower.	  All	  such	  representations	  are	  value-­‐laden.	  Clarity	  
from	  objective	  analysis	  can	  improve	  the	  political	  process.	  	  
e)	  Does	  change	  make	  the	  system	  more	  resilient,	  or	  less	  resilient?	  
Responses	  to	  drivers	  may	  increase	  or	  decrease	  resilience.	  Who	  knows?	  For	  example,	  a	  policy	  
response	  to	  revive	  flow	  in	  the	  Yellow	  River	  (see	  Ringler	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  demonstrates	  an	  impressive	  
ability	  to	  control	  a	  major	  water	  management	  system.	  Conversely	  the	  apparent	  inability	  of	  
governments	  to	  control	  groundwater	  use	  by	  farmers	  in	  the	  Ganges	  	  (Sharma	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  appears	  to	  
imply	  serious	  loss	  of	  resilience.	  But	  which	  change	  is	  more	  resilient	  in	  thelong-­‐term?	  As	  the	  
presentations	  cited	  below	  show,	  conditions	  are	  rarely	  so	  simple,	  since	  they	  include	  many	  non-­‐
linearities	  and	  feedbacks.	  Prediction	  is	  difficult	  and	  frequently	  ill-­‐advised,	  but	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  
of	  the	  systems	  as	  described	  by	  resilience	  theory	  will	  at	  least	  ensure	  that	  the	  complete	  range	  of	  
questions	  are	  asked.	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Basic	  points	  about	  the	  change	  process:	  
The	  decision	  to	  change	  or	  not	  change	  should	  take	  into	  account	  the	  following:	  	  
• Change	  is	  inevitable	  –	  even	  a	  lack	  of	  response	  results	  in	  change.	  All	  systems	  are	  partially	  
open	  and	  dynamic.	  Ignorance	  of	  change,	  or	  a	  decision	  to	  ‘do	  nothing’	  does	  not	  isolate	  the	  
system	  from	  external	  influences	  but	  merely	  puts	  the	  system	  in	  a	  relatively	  worse	  condition.	  	  
• Change	  begets	  change:	  In	  a	  dynamic	  environment,	  responses	  to	  drivers	  themselves	  become	  
drivers.	  Between	  1960	  and	  2008,	  population	  growth	  has	  more	  than	  tripled	  population	  
density	  in	  India	  from	  99/km2	  to	  338/km2	  with	  a	  consequent	  reduction	  in	  land	  area	  per	  
capita.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  population	  growth	  increased	  demand	  for	  food,	  and	  also	  created	  
markets	  for	  water	  for	  those	  fortunate	  enough	  to	  maintain	  access.	  As	  the	  market	  developed,	  
for	  example,	  higher	  value	  dairy	  products	  became	  more	  attractive.	  
• Drivers	  are	  external	  and	  internal.	  The	  difference	  between	  external	  drivers	  and	  their	  internal	  
progeny	  can	  be	  indistinct.	  For	  example,	  massive	  increases	  in	  the	  demand	  for	  hydropower	  
originated	  outside	  the	  Mekong	  basin	  but	  these	  give	  rise	  to	  other	  demands	  for	  food	  and	  land	  
around	  the	  sites	  being	  developed	  for	  hydropower.	  Similar	  external-­‐internal	  links	  can	  be	  seen	  
in	  Ethiopia	  and	  Colombia	  with	  the	  development	  of	  high	  value	  chains	  for	  coffee.	  	  
• Change	  is	  multi-­‐dimensional.	  Change	  affects	  many	  different	  attributes	  of	  a	  system,	  including	  
income,	  resource	  condition	  and	  social	  capital.	  Not	  all	  are	  represented	  by	  conventional	  
economic	  models.	  For	  example,	  development	  of	  mining	  industries	  in	  the	  Andes	  rapidly	  
enhances	  income,	  but	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  water	  quality.	  	  
• Change	  does	  not	  affect	  all	  equally.	  Change	  tends	  to	  work	  through	  existing	  power	  structures.	  
Those	  with	  power	  tend	  to	  benefit	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  poor,	  who	  are	  without	  voice.	  This	  
imbalance	  can	  be	  corrected	  by	  political	  processes,	  but	  normally	  only	  after	  a	  substantial	  time	  
lag.	  
• Response	  is	  non-­‐linear.	  Investment	  in	  the	  system	  can	  improve	  total	  productivity	  so	  that	  gain	  
is	  positive.	  In	  the	  Indian	  Punjab,	  a	  massive	  investment	  in	  the	  agricultural	  system	  during	  the	  
Green	  Revolution	  saw	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  total	  factor	  productivity	  of	  irrigated	  systems.	  
Conversely,	  lack	  of	  change	  from	  this	  trajectory	  now	  increases	  the	  risk	  of	  rapid	  decline	  of	  
water	  availability	  because	  of	  unsustainable	  use	  of	  ground	  water	  leading	  to	  loss	  of	  resilience.	  
• Decision	  processes	  are	  highly	  uncertain.	  All	  aspects	  of	  the	  decision	  process	  are	  beset	  by	  
uncertainty:	  the	  influences	  themselves	  are	  often	  unclear,	  especially	  in	  their	  early	  stages	  
when	  decisions	  can	  be	  most	  effective;	  the	  interactions	  amongst	  drivers,	  for	  example	  
between	  population	  pressure	  and	  climate	  change,	  add	  further	  uncertainty;	  	  the	  
consequences	  of	  response	  are	  less	  so;	  the	  social	  and	  political	  implications	  of	  change	  (or	  lack	  
of	  it)	  encourage	  a	  ‘do	  nothing’	  mentality.	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5.	  Summary	  table	  
Basin	   Economic	   Population/demographic	   Political	   GCC	   Inn	  &techmp;pg	  
Andes	  	   Mining	  resource	  boom	  	   Low	  population	  increases	  for	  the	  past	  20	  
years.	  Rural	  depopulation.	  High	  rates	  of	  
urbanization	  
US-­‐dominated	  policies	  of	  70s	  and	  
80s	  being	  replaced	  by	  politics	  that	  
recognizes	  indigenous	  rights.	  
Regional	  specializations.	  
Biodiversity	  loss.	  Some	  changes	  of	  
glacial	  melt.	  
	  
Ganges	   India	  economy	  exerts	  major	  
pressures	  through	  demands	  
for	  energy	  
Bangladesh	  birth	  rates	  low.	  India	  remains	  
high.	  
Water	  policies	  ‘hijacked’	  by	  special	  
interests	  of	  select	  farm	  groups	  
Rise	  in	  sea	  level	  a	  major	  threat	  in	  
the	  delta.	  
Monitoring?	  	  
Limpopo	   Strong	  local	  markets	  from	  
industrialization.	  
Surge	  in	  mining	  puts	  extra	  
demands	  on	  water,	  but	  also	  a	  
major	  employment	  
opportunity.	  	  
Exodus	  of	  young	  farmers	  leaves	  farming	  in	  
hands	  of	  an	  aging	  population.	  Feminization	  
of	  agriculture	  as	  a	  result	  of	  HIV	  and	  labour	  
migration.	  
SADC	  regional	  politics	  needed	  to	  
harmonize	  policy.	  
	  
All	  models	  indicate	  major	  
reduction	  of	  rainfall	  by	  2050.	  
Poses	  major	  threat	  to	  cropping	  
and	  reduced	  flows	  in	  an	  already	  
water-­‐scarce	  basin	  
	  
Mekong	   Major	  demand	  for	  
hydropower	  from	  ‘dragon	  
economies’	  of	  China,	  Thailand	  
and	  Vietnam.	  
Moderate	  population	  growth.	  Increasing	  
discrepancy	  between	  rich	  and	  poor;	  rural-­‐
urban	  migration.	  	  
Democratization	  still	  in	  process	  in	  
some	  countries.	  	  
Uncertain	  impacts	  on	  river	  flow.	   Internet	  
democracy?	  
Nile	   Increasing	  connection	  with	  
international	  trade.	  
HP	  an	  emerging	  opportunity.	  
FDI	  inland	  and	  in	  water	  
Rapid	  population	  growth.	  Birth	  rates	  in	  
Ethiopia	  remain	  high.	  	  
Major	  changes	  in	  Egyptian	  regional	  
dominance.	  Increasing	  acceptance	  
of	  Ethiopia.	  Kenya	  and	  Uganda	  
emerging	  from	  the	  shadow.	  	  
Major	  demand	  for	  institutional	  
underpinning	  of	  change.	  
Major	  threat	  to	  sustainability	  of	  
rainfed	  systems.	  
Land	  degradation	  seen	  as	  a	  
widespread	  problem.	  
Micro-­‐finance?	  
Volta	   Increasing	  influence	  of	  
external	  markets.	  FDI	  in	  land	  
and	  water.	  Oil	  and	  gold	  major	  
movers	  in	  Ghana	  
Major	  pressures	  from	  increased	  population	  
in	  Sahel	  and	  gulf	  region.	  
Migration.	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  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/demog-­‐social-­‐econ-­‐
eric-­‐kemp-­‐benedict	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Future	  scenario	  thinking:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/introduction-­‐to-­‐future-­‐scenarios-­‐
thinking-­‐theory-­‐and-­‐exercise-­‐cpwf-­‐gd-­‐workshop-­‐sept-­‐2011	  	  








Topic	  working	  groups	  CPWF	  and	  CRP5:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/cpwf-­‐and-­‐crp5-­‐cpwf-­‐gd-­‐
workshop-­‐september-­‐2011	  	  
Mekong:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/mekong-­‐drivers-­‐of-­‐change-­‐cpwf-­‐gd-­‐workshop-­‐sept-­‐2011	  	  
Volta:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/volta-­‐drivers-­‐of-­‐change-­‐cpwf-­‐gd-­‐workshop-­‐sept-­‐2011	  	  
Limpopo:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/limpopo-­‐drivers-­‐of-­‐change-­‐cpwf-­‐gd-­‐workshop-­‐sept-­‐
2011	  	  
Andes:	  http://www.slideshare.net/CPWF/gdtwg-­‐session-­‐posters-­‐ifwf	  
